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A “JUSTIFIED NEED” FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF “GOOD CAUSE”
CONCEALED CARRY PROVISIONS
Andrew Kim*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller held that the prohibition of handguns in the home was unconstitutional
and the Court extended this holding to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in McDonald v. City of Chicago. Through these cases, the Court
clarified that the core of the Second Amendment was self-defense. However,
it did not specify the scope of this self-defense “core” and left the lower
courts with room for interpretation—for example, it is unclear whether and
to what extent the Second Amendment applies to the public space.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not provide a standard of review for
lower courts to apply when weighing the constitutionality of gun regulations.
Lastly, while the Court relied heavily on the nation’s history to justify its
holding in Heller, it did not give any further guidance regarding the sources
of history that the Court deemed most reliable.
Given these ambiguities, states have implemented statutes that require
law-abiding citizens interested in obtaining a handgun license for concealed
public carry to articulate a specified need for self-defense. Lower courts had
generally accepted such provisions as constitutional until the D.C. Circuit in
Wrenn v. District of Columbia held otherwise.
This Note analyzes the constitutionality of these provisions. It attempts to
clarify some of the Supreme Court’s ambiguities through its analysis and
ultimately proposes that these state statutes are constitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
States are currently grappling with increasing gun regulation in response
to high levels of gun-related violence.1 In 2018 alone, there were 337 mass
shootings where four or more people were killed or injured, not including the
shooter.2 This amounts to almost one mass shooting a day. So far this year,
1. In 2018, state legislatures passed a total of 126 pieces of legislation involving guns,
ranging from disqualifying owners to allowing more access. Gun Laws in 2018, NEWSDAY,
https://projects.newsday.com/databases/long-island/gun-laws-in-2018
[https://perma.cc/
6PN2-Y9FR] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
2. Past
Summary
Ledgers,
GUN
VIOLENCE
ARCHIVE,
http://
www.gunviolencearchive.org/past-tolls [https://perma.cc/6WB2-384U] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019). For the purposes of this Note, I use this definition of a “mass shooting”; however,
other sources have defined it in various ways. See, e.g., Mark Follman et al., A Guide to Mass
Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 31, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map
[https://perma.cc/24XUKD6N] (adopting terminology from the FBI and defining a mass shooting as a “single attack
in a public place in which four or more victims were killed”).
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as of October 6, 2019, there have already been 324 reported incidents of mass
shootings, which suggests a continuing trend from 2018.3
The recent data on gun violence is not an anomaly; in fact, it speaks to an
underlying pattern of gun violence that has been steadily increasing over the
past four years.4 While the number of actual shootings has been about the
same over the past three years, the number of injuries and deaths has risen
every year.5 For example, in 2017, there were about three thousand more
reported deaths and ten thousand more reported injuries compared to 2014.6
The increase in gun violence has heightened the debate around gun control.
Those who support more gun control call for increased gun regulation, such
as requiring more thorough background checks and greater protections
against the mentally ill buying guns.7 They argue that having more gun
control laws would reduce gun deaths,8 that guns are rarely used in selfdefense,9 that legally owned guns are often stolen,10 and that the presence of
a gun makes a conflict more likely to turn violent.11 Additionally, the United
States has one of the highest gun homicide rates compared to other high-

3. Gun
Violence
Archive
2019,
GUN
VIOLENCE
ARCHIVE,
https://
www.gunviolencearchive.org [https://perma.cc/Y3L9-TKBQ] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
4. See Past Summary Ledgers, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. History of Gun Control, PROCON.ORG, https://gun-control.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=006436 [https://perma.cc/6CSM-GFEC] (last updated Mar.
25, 2019).
8. A March 2016 study found that “implementing federal universal background checks
could reduce firearm deaths by a projected 56.9%; background checks for ammunition
purchases could reduce death by a projected 80.7%; and gun identification requirements could
reduce deaths by a projected 82.5%. Gun licensing laws were associated with a 14% decrease
in firearm homicides . . . .” Should More Gun Control Laws Be Enacted?, PROCON.ORG,
https://gun-control.procon.org [https://perma.cc/Y3HD-B6ZV] (last updated Aug. 14, 2019).
Having a gun in the home makes it three times more likely that a homicide will occur in the
home and makes it five times more likely that a suicide will occur in the home. Symposium,
Heller in the Lower Courts, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399, 411 (2018).
9. Should More Gun Control Laws Be Enacted?, supra note 8 (“Of the 29,618,300
violent crimes committed between 2007 and 2011, 0.79% of victims . . . protected themselves
with a threat of use or use of a firearm . . . . Of the 84,495,500 property crimes committed
between 2007 and 2011, 0.12% of victims . . . protected themselves with a threat of use or use
of a firearm.”).
10. Id. “Between 2005 and 2010, 1.4 million guns were stolen from US homes during
property crimes . . . [and] the presence of more guns can actually serve as a stimulus to [more]
burglary and theft.” Id.
11. In a June 1985 study, “the American Journal of Public Health found that ‘the weapons
used [in altercations] were those closest at hand.’” Id. (quoting Jess Hedeboe et al.,
Interpersonal Violence: Patterns in a Danish Community, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 651, 651
(1985)). “Gun-inflicted deaths ensue from impromptu arguments and fights: in the U.S., twothirds of the 7,900 deaths in 1981 involving arguments and brawls were caused by guns.”
Susan P. Baker, Without Guns, Do People Kill People?, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 587, 587–88
(1985). Gun prevalence also increases criminal violence and harm in the community because
of a greater shift towards lethality. Symposium, supra note 8, at 411.
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income nations.12 Furthermore, stricter gun control policies have proven to
be effective in reducing gun homicides and suicides.13
Opponents of gun control argue that such laws do not deter crime; in fact,
gun ownership deters crime.14 Additionally, gun control laws would not
actually prevent potential criminals from obtaining guns or breaking the
law,15 and more gun control is unnecessary because, compared to other
causes of death, relatively few people are killed by guns.16 Opponents of gun
control believe that gun regulations have generally been ineffective17 and,
instead of more gun control, education about guns and gun safety is likely
more helpful.18
States and cities like the District of Columbia have recently tightened gun
regulations by limiting the possession of firearms in public spaces.19 Similar
to gun control laws adopted in states like New York, New Jersey, Maryland,
and California, these laws permit some individuals to carry guns in public
but require them to pass a stricter licensing procedure.20 Specifically, states
have required users to articulate a self-defense need explaining why carrying
a handgun in public is justified.21 The federal courts have generally accepted

12. See Kara Fox, How US Gun Culture Compares with the World, CNN (Aug. 6, 2019,
10:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/americas/us-gun-statistics/index.html [https://
perma.cc/AQP8-8JG3].
13. Switzerland and Finland, for example, are countries that “require gun owners to
acquire licenses and pass background checks . . . among other restrictions and requirements.”
Should More Gun Control Laws Be Enacted?, supra note 8. They rank third and fourth in
international gun ownership rates (both about 45 guns per 100 people) whereas the United
States ranks first with 88.8 guns per 100 people as of 2007. Id.
14. A November 2013 study found that “states with restrictions on the carrying of
concealed weapons had higher gun-related murder rates than other states.” Mark Gius, An
Examination of the Effects of Concealed Weapons Laws and Assault Weapons Bans on StateLevel Murder Rates, 21 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 265, 265 (2014). On the other hand, “[w]hile
gun ownership doubled in the twentieth century, the murder rate decreased.” Should More
Gun Control Laws Be Enacted?, supra note 8.
15. Id. “Of 62 mass shootings in the United States between 1982 and 2012, 49 of the
shooters used legally obtained guns. Collectively, 143 guns were possessed by the killers with
about 75% obtained legally.” Id.
16. Id. (“[B]etween 1999 and 2013, Americans were 21.5 times more likely to die of heart
disease (9,691,733 deaths); 18.7 times more likely to die of malignant tumors (8,458,868
deaths); and 2.4 times more likely to die of diabetes or 2.3 times more likely to die of
Alzheimer’s (1,080,298 and 1,053,207 respectively) than to die from a firearm (whether by
accident, homicide, or suicide). The flu and related pneumonia (875,143 deaths); traffic
accidents (594,280 deaths); and poisoning whether via accident, homicide, or suicide (475,907
deaths) all killed more people between 1999 and 2013 than firearms.”).
17. Id. “[M]ost state level gun control laws do not reduce firearm death rates, and, of 25
state laws, nine were associated with higher gun death rates.” Id.
18. Id. “95% of all US gun owners believe that children should learn about gun
safety . . . . [P]eople need more gun education and mental illness screening to prevent
massacres.” Id.
19. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
20. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher,
712 F.3d 865, 869 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84–85
(2d Cir. 2012).
21. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655 (requiring a “good reason to fear injury” in D.C.); Drake,
724 F.3d at 429 (requiring a “justifiable need” in New Jersey); Woollard, 712 F.3d at 869

2019]

"GOOD CAUSE" CONCEALED CARRY PROVISIONS

765

these provisions either because of the statute’s long-standing history in the
state or because these courts have deemed that the protections of the Second
Amendment are weaker in the public space.22 However, the most recent
decision by the D.C. Circuit, echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
District of Columbia v. Heller23 (Heller I) and referring to other case law,
held that such statutory provisions are unconstitutional because a
requirement asking law-abiding citizens to specify a self-defense reason for
public carry would put too great of a burden on the Second Amendment’s
core.24 This circuit split leaves an unclear path forward for how other gun
control measures in the public space will be viewed by other courts, leaving
them, perhaps, in a constitutional limbo.25
This Note examines the circuit split created by Wrenn v. District of
Columbia26 and analyzes whether state statutes requiring law-abiding
citizens to articulate a particular need for self-defense to obtain a concealed
public carry license are constitutional. Part I examines the extent of the
Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence and identifies the
questions left unanswered for the lower courts. Part II weighs the
constitutionality of the state statutory provisions in question by considering
various interpretations of the Second Amendment’s scope. Part III then
suggests that while the core of the Second Amendment includes both the right
to have a handgun in the home and in public, the public right was always
meant to be a weaker right, allowing it to be subjected to greater regulation.
Furthermore, this Note proposes that courts should defer to legislative bodies,
which are better equipped to understand the contexts and implications of gun
use in their respective localities.
I. THE SELF-DEFENSE CORE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE
AMBIGUITIES LEFT BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Second Amendment is
currently limited to Heller I and McDonald v. City of Chicago,27 which were
decided almost a decade ago. The Supreme Court has not affirmatively ruled
on any other Second Amendment issue since then,28 leaving lower courts
unsure of the scope of their holdings. Recently, however, the Court has
granted certiorari to determine whether certain regulations that limit the

(requiring a “good and substantial reason” in Maryland); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 84 (requiring
a demonstration of “‘proper cause’—a special need for self-protection” in New York).
22. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 430–31; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–78; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d
at 89.
23. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
24. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666–67.
25. See infra Part I.B.
26. 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
27. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
28. See Protecting Strong Gun Laws : The Supreme Court Leaves Lower Court Victories
Untouched, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/protecting-strong-gun-laws-thesupreme-court-leaves-lower-court-victories-untouched [https://perma.cc/SQD9-93DX] (last
updated May 31, 2019).
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transfer of handguns obtained with a premises license are constitutional.29
This is an opportunity for the Court to clarify its understanding of the Second
Amendment.
First, this Part walks through the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence leading up to Heller I and McDonald.30 Then, this Part
identifies the ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.31 These
ambiguities have led the lower courts to uphold a wide range of gun laws
regulating the public carry of handguns, which has ultimately led to the
circuit split this Note discusses.32
A. The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Jurisprudence
Since the Second Amendment was ratified in the eighteenth century, the
Supreme Court has not weighed in on the individual nature of the
Amendment’s words: “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.”33 In fact, the Supreme Court initially believed that an
individual right to gun ownership did not exist within the Second
Amendment.34 Instead, the Court held that the Second Amendment was a
collective right pertaining to the maintenance of the militia35 in the three
cases it considered regarding this matter, the last being United States v.
Miller36 in 1939.37
Following the Miller decision, the Court largely refrained from ruling on
gun regulations governing the individual right to carry throughout the
twentieth century.38 However, as the focus on guns began to peak through
numerous well-publicized acts of violence, state legislatures became
increasingly active in imposing gun restrictions.39 Still, the courts were
generally not involved, as this issue was largely left to the democratic
branches, and there seemed to be no limits on what sorts of policies could be
passed in order to preserve order.40
By the twenty-first century, the country was increasingly concerned about
gun violence and states began to pass legislation in the form of bans to

29. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 939 (2019).
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
34. See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 96–97 (2015).
35. See id.
36. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
37. See WALDMAN, supra note 34, at 96–97; see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (holding that
Congress can regulate a sawed-off shotgun because it did not have a “reasonable relationship
to the preservation . . . of a well regulated militia”). See generally Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535 (1894) (referring to the notion that a criminal defendant did not have an individual right
to keep and bear arms); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (referring to the notion that
gun rights belong to the militias).
38. WALDMAN, supra note 34, at 83–84.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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promote gun control.41 For example, the District of Columbia made it
unlawful to possess handguns in the home and “require[d] that any lawful
firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times,
rendering it inoperable.”42 In response to this legislation, the Supreme Court
finally stepped in with its 2008 landmark decision in Heller I.
In interpreting the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court in Heller I
moved away from its previously held notion that the Second Amendment is
a collective right.43 Rather, it held that the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right to keep and bear arms.44 To justify the necessity of an
individual right, the Court held that self-defense was considered the “first
law of nature” by leaders of the past.45 Historically, rulers were able to
restrict individual liberties and take command with the use of standing armies
by curtailing the individual right to bear arms.46 In response, the Court held
that the Second Amendment served to preserve the militia by preventing the
federal government from stripping its citizens of their right to self-defense
by taking away their arms.47 Therefore, from its origins, the “central
component” of the Second Amendment was the individual right to selfdefense.48
After establishing the Second Amendment’s individual right, the Court
further held that it is “the home, where the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute.”49 Therefore, while the Court acknowledged that
the scope of the Second Amendment had its limitations,50 “certain policy
choices [were necessarily] off the table. These include the absolute
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.”51
Preventing handguns from being in the home was unconstitutional because
the “core” of the Second Amendment—the individual right to self-defense—
was improperly burdened.52
In 2010, the Supreme Court extended Heller I’s Second Amendment
holding to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in McDonald v. City
of Chicago.53 While the Court moved away from some of its justifications
in Heller I, specifically its concerns that the federal government would
41. See District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
42. See id. at 628.
43. See id. at 579–81.
44. See id. at 622.
45. See id. at 606.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 599.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
50. At this time the Second Amendment only applied to the Federal Government because
the Court believed that “[s]tates . . . were free to restrict or protect the right under their [own]
police powers,” especially considering matters such as public peace. Id. at 607–08, 620. The
Court further held that their ruling should not “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Id. at 626–27.
51. Id. at 636.
52. Id. at 634.
53. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
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disarm the militia by stripping away the arms of its citizens, it ultimately held
that “the right to keep and bear arms was [still] highly valued for purposes of
self-defense.”54 The Court explained that certain Bill of Rights provisions
that are “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of
justice”55 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” are
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56
That said, the Court in McDonald held that “[s]elf-defense is a basic right,
recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day.”57
Echoing the analysis in Heller I, the Court deemed that the Second
Amendment should be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment because
the right to self-defense, particularly being “most acute” in the home, was
indeed “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” since its
ratification in the eighteenth century.58
As in Heller I, the Court in McDonald did not detail the Second
Amendment’s full scope and limitations as they would be applied to the
states.59 The Court only implied that the incorporation of the Second
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment should not
yield a “watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantee[]”
because “it would be ‘incongruous’ to apply different standards.”60
B. The Holes in Heller: The State of Gun Regulations in the United States
Today
The Supreme Court in Heller I and McDonald made at least two things
clear: statutes that ban handguns in the home were unconstitutional because
they impinged on the Second Amendment’s core of self-defense and the right
to self-defense was at its strongest in the home.61 However, the Court did
not articulate the reach of its holdings.62 For example, in Heller, the Court
gave examples of long-standing prohibitions that would be presumptively
upheld as constitutional gun regulations;63 however, it did not clarify what
the threshold of “long-standing” would be. Additionally, the Supreme Court
did not leave the lower courts with a mechanism to analyze new gun laws.
This left the lower courts to come up with standards of review on their own.
Most courts began to adopt a two-part test, used by the D.C. Circuit in
Heller v. District of Columbia 64 (Heller II), derived from First Amendment
jurisprudence.65 The two-part test “ask[s] first whether a particular provision
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 770.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id. at 768.
See id. at 768–70.
Id. at 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 768.
See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 626.
For examples of long-standing prohibitions, see supra note 50.
670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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burdens a Second Amendment right and then, if it does, go[es] on to
determine whether the provision passes muster under the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny.”66 However, without additional guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts inconsistently applied this test to public gun
laws because it was unclear at what point the Second Amendment’s core of
self-defense would be burdened.67
The lack of clarity around the history of “long-standing” provisions, the
scope of the Second Amendment’s core of self-defense, and the appropriate
standard of review left lower courts with a lot of discretion.68 Consequently,
regulation of the public carrying of handguns “resemble[d] a patchwork quilt
that largely reflect[ed] local custom.”69
States have implemented different degrees of public gun regulations
between open carry and concealed carry.70 Currently, thirty-one states allow
citizens to openly carry a handgun in public without a license or a permit.71
On the other hand, there are five states that prohibit open carry in public
places in general.72 Lastly, there are fourteen states that require some form
of license or permit.73 Fifteen states allow for the concealed carry of a
handgun in public without a license or permit.74 Thirty-five states generally
require a permit in order to carry concealed weapons in public; however, the
amount of regulation within these states varies.75 For example, seven of the
thirty-five states require a showing of “good cause or a justifiable need to
carry a concealed weapon,” which generally means that the applicant needs
to show a credible threat to his or her safety “that cannot be alleviated through
other legal channels.”76 These states are California, Delaware, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York.77
66. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Heller
II, 670 F.3d at 1252).
67. Symposium, supra note 8, at 413.
68. See id. at 413–16.
69. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
70. “‘Open carry’ refers to the practice of carrying openly visible firearms in public.”
Open Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-inpublic/open-carry [https://perma.cc/J54F-SEHP] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). Concealed carry
refers to the carrying of “concealed, loaded guns in public spaces.” Concealed Carry,
GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/
concealed-carry [https://perma.cc/Z4PZ-WDQE] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
71. Open Carry, supra note 70.
72. Id. “Five states (California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and South Carolina), as well
as the District of Columbia, generally prohibit people from openly carrying handguns in public
places.” Id.
73. Id. (including New Jersey and Maryland).
74. Concealed Carry, supra note 70.
75. For example, within the permit regulations, there are “may issue” laws and “shall
issue” laws, the former giving “significant discretion to the issuing official to grant or deny
the permit.” Id.
76. Id.
77. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150(a)(2) (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1441(a)(1) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a) (2019); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5306(a)(6)(ii) (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(d) (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-4(c) (West 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2019). For the sake
of brevity, this Note refers to these provisions within the statutes as “good cause” provisions.
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Federal circuit courts have held that such “good cause” provisions in
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York are
constitutional.78 The District of Columbia tried to follow this trend by
implementing its own “good cause” provision within its concealed carry
statute; however, the D.C. Circuit deemed the provision unconstitutional.79
The circuit court for the remaining state, Massachusetts, has yet to make a
decision.
II. ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF “GOOD CAUSE” PROVISIONS
Without further clarity from the Supreme Court, lower courts have
weighed in on the constitutionality of these “good cause” provisions through
varied interpretations of history, the Second Amendment’s core of selfdefense, and the application of the two-part test used in Heller II.80 This Part
first explores the arguments for the unconstitutionality of “good cause”
provisions in the concealed public carry statutes.81 Specifically, this Part
points out the historical interpretations, the interpretation of the Second
Amendment’s core, and the standard of review that best support these
Then, this Part considers the
provisions’ unconstitutionality.82
constitutionality of “good cause” provisions83 and highlights the arguments
that best support these provisions’ constitutionality.84
A. Unconstitutionality of “Good Cause” Provisions
The D.C. Circuit in Wrenn v. District of Columbia is the only circuit court
thus far that has held that “good cause” provisions are unconstitutional.85
The Wrenn court addressed a D.C. concealed carry provision that limited the
distribution of permits to those who had “good reason to fear injury to their
person or property” or “any other proper reason for carrying a pistol.”86 In
order to show a “good reason to fear injury,” applicants had to show a
“special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community
as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks that
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life.”87 For example, “an
applicant’s need to carry around cash or valuables as a part of her job” would
be sufficient for an applicant to receive a concealed carry license.88

78. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2016); Drake v.
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882–83 (4th
Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012).
79. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
80. See id.; Peruta, 824 F.3d at 941–42; Drake, 724 F.3d at 429; Woollard, 712 F.3d at
882–83; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 84.
81. See infra Part II.A.
82. See infra Part II.A.
83. See infra Part II.B.
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655.
86. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 22-4506(a)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 656.
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However, simply “living or working ‘in a high crime area [did] not by itself
establish a good reason.’”89
The court determined that “good cause” provisions are unconstitutional
without applying any standard of review because the self-defense core was
not only burdened but effectively destroyed.90 The D.C. Circuit interpreted
the Second Amendment’s core broadly to include self-defense generally and
not just within the home.91 Despite its lone standing amongst its sister courts,
the D.C. Circuit’s stance has garnered support amongst scholars who argue
that the court’s reasoning is doctrinally sound.92 This section analyzes the
arguments that support the D.C. Circuit’s holding by examining the court’s
justifications for a broader interpretation of the Second Amendment’s core,
the relevant history it cites, and its reasoning behind not applying a standard
of review.
1. The Broad Scope of the Second Amendment’s Core
The Wrenn court determined that the individual right to carry handguns
beyond the home and in the public space fell within the Second
Amendment’s core.93 In other words, the Second Amendment’s core
protected individual self-defense generally.94 The Wrenn court looked to the
text of the Amendment and applied the definitions of “keeping” and
“bearing” arms used in Heller I.95 It held that the “definition[s] show[] that
the Amendment’s core must span . . . the ‘right to possess and carry weapons
in case of confrontation.’”96 This covered carrying beyond the home for selfdefense because, echoing Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit,
“[c]onfrontations are not limited to the home.”97
Some have justified the Wrenn court’s broad reading of the Second
Amendment by citing to Moore v. Madigan,98 in which the Seventh Circuit
struck down a ban on public carrying altogether.99 While the underlying facts
differ, the Seventh Circuit alluded to the broad nature of the Second
Amendment’s core as a part of its analysis.100 In Heller I, the Supreme Court

89. Id. (quoting D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 2333.4).
90. See id. at 666.
91. See id. at 657 (stating that “the Amendment’s ‘core lawful purpose’ is self-defense . . .
and the need for [self-defense] might arise beyond as well as within the home” (quoting Heller
I, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008))).
92. See generally Betty J. Craipo, Judicial Toleration for Negative Externalities of
Bearing Arms in Public: Addressing the Second Amendment Circuit Split, 14 SETON HALL
CIR. REV. 209 (2018); John R. Thompson, Note, An Elevated Need for Constitutional Rights:
Good Cause Requirements and Washington, D.C. Concealed Carry Applications, 26 GEO.
MASON U. C.R.L.J. 381 (2016).
93. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661.
94. See id. at 659.
95. Id. at 657–58.
96. Id. at 658 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)).
97. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012).
98. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
99. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 92, at 399.
100. See Moore, 702 F.3d at 935–36.
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stated that the need for self-defense was “most acute” in the home.101 The
Seventh Circuit emphasized the use of the comparative term to highlight the
notion that the need for self-defense also had to be acute outside of the
home.102 The court then proceeded with a commonsense approach, stating
that “one doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear
arms . . . could not rationally have been limited to the home”103 because a
citizen is a “good deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough
neighborhood than in his apartment.”104
The Wrenn court went further, stating that “[t]he rights to keep and to bear,
to possess and to carry, are equally important” to the extent that alternative
channels must be left for people to access both.105 Therefore, private and
public gun regulations might not necessarily destroy the Second
Amendment’s core of self-defense as long as the restrictions leave “ample
opportunities” for both.106 For example, prohibiting the public carrying of
handguns near “sensitive”107 sites listed in Heller I does not destroy the
Amendment’s core because the right can still be preserved by simply
avoiding those places.108
2. Historical Interpretation of Broad Public Carry Rights
To further justify its reasoning, the Wrenn court echoed the history
presented in Heller I and focused on the general trends of public carrying at
the time of the nation’s founding.109 The Wrenn court pointed out that “by
the time of the Founding, the ‘preexisting right’ enshrined by the
Amendment . . . ripened to include carrying more broadly.”110 It was an
“individual right protecting against both public and private violence.”111
The D.C. Circuit highlighted this notion of a broadened “pre-existing
right” by citing to late nineteenth-century case law.112 These cases spoke of
the right to bear arms, not only for the purposes of defending one’s home and
property but also for the purpose of protecting oneself as necessary.113 The
101. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (emphasis added).
102. Moore, 702 F.3d at 935–36.
103. Id. at 936.
104. Id. at 937.
105. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
106. Id. In this Note, “private gun regulations” refer to regulations of at-home gun use and
“public gun regulations” refer to regulations of gun use outside the home.
107. Id. at 626. Examples of “sensitive” sites include schools and government buildings.
See supra note 50.
108. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 662.
109. See id. at 660.
110. Id.
111. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008).
112. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 658.
113. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–17 (1840) (allowing regulation regarding the
“manner of bearing arms” but not to the extent where the right would be “wholly useless for
the purpose of defence”); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (stating that a “prohibition
against bearing arms openly” would be deemed invalid); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489,
490 (1850) (acknowledging that the Second Amendment protects a right to open carry, at least
where the firearm is “in full open view”); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 187
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court acknowledged that there were also nineteenth-century cases that upheld
“onerous limits” on carrying guns in spite of the Second Amendment.114
However, the Wrenn court dismissed these cases as irrelevant because their
holdings were based on the Second Amendment’s collective right of
maintaining a militia, which the Supreme Court in Heller I clarified was an
outdated doctrine.115
The Wrenn court further bolstered its opinion by considering historical
arguments that favored the long-standing nature of public carrying
restrictions.116 Specifically, it considered the old English Statute of
Northampton and “surety laws.”117
The 1328 Northampton statute was an English law that banned carrying
firearms in crowded areas and, by the late eighteenth century and early
nineteenth century, several American colonies and states had adopted similar
laws.118 However, the Wrenn court, echoing the Supreme Court in Heller I,
held that such Northampton-like laws do not have any merit because they
were beyond the scope of public carrying.119 The Northampton laws were
targeted towards banning “only the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons’”120 or the wielding of weapons “with evil intent or in such a way
as ‘to terrify the King’s subjects.’”121 Neither of these purposes pertained to
the general right to publicly carry firearms.
English “surety laws” required an individual with a pistol to pay a bond
that covered any damage he might do, unless the individual proved that there
was “reason to fear injury to his person or family or property.”122 These
“surety laws” were arguably comparable to the “good cause” provisions at
issue in that individuals were required to articulate a specified reason to
justify the potential use of the pistol. However, the Wrenn court dismissed
this comparison because the “surety laws” limited the individual’s use of a
handgun and not the individual’s possession of one.123 In other words, under
“surety laws,” people still had “robust carrying rights” as they were already
allowed to publicly carry handguns without facing any criminal penalty.124
3. A Standard of Review Does Not Apply
The Wrenn court established that the Second Amendment’s core included
an equal public and private right subject to long-standing restrictions that
(1871) (invalidating a ban on carrying pistols “publicly or privately, without regard to time or
place, or circumstances”). For a full list of cases that the Wrenn court references, see Wrenn,
864 F.3d at 658.
114. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 658.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 659–60.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 660.
119. See id. at 660–61.
120. Id. at 660 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008)).
121. Id. (quoting Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76).
122. Id. at 661.
123. See id.
124. Id.
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leave “ample opportunities” to bear arms. The court then concluded that the
“good cause” provisions were unconstitutional without applying a standard
of review.125 The court acknowledged that, in its own holding in Heller II,
it adopted the two-step approach for reviewing gun laws, which was widely
used by other courts.126 The two-step approach considered whether the
provision in question burdened the Second Amendment right, and, if it did,
required the court to apply the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.127
In Heller II, the court drew comparisons to its First Amendment
jurisprudence and concluded that the appropriate level of scrutiny would
typically be limited to intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny.128 However,
the Wrenn court held that its own precedent did not apply to its analysis of
“good cause” provisions because the opinion in Heller II was “expressly
limited . . . to laws ‘significantly less severe’ than a ‘total prohibition.’”129
The Wrenn court interpreted the “good cause” provision as an overall ban
on public carry that made a narrow exception for D.C. residents who were
able to show a “special need.”130 Interpreted this way, the court felt that the
“good cause” provision was similar to the prohibition of handguns in the
home struck down in Heller I.131 The “good cause” provisions substantially
burdened and destroyed the Second Amendment’s core of self-defense
because it did not provide the ordinary citizen with any alternative
channels.132
Notably, the Wrenn court also acknowledged that the D.C. Council had
already passed legislation that placed significant limitations on public
carrying.133 Therefore, while not explicitly stated, the court may have further
considered D.C.’s “good cause” provision as “necessarily a total ban on most
D.C. residents’ right to carry a gun” because of the territory’s unique
context.134 The combined restrictions on open carry and concealed carry
speak further to the limited alternative means to carry a gun in the public
space and the substantial burden that the “good cause” provisions have on
the Second Amendment’s core.
B. Constitutionality of “Good Cause” Provisions
The Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits analyzed similar “good
cause” requirements for applicants who sought to obtain concealed carry
licenses. However, in contrast to Wrenn, they each upheld the respective
125. See id. at 666–67.
126. See id. at 666.
127. Id.
128. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In Heller II, the court described
how courts generally treat First Amendment regulations, noting that severe restrictions would
require an analysis under strict scrutiny, whereas intermediate scrutiny would suffice for more
modest restrictions. See id.
129. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666 (quoting Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1266).
130. Id. at 665.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 662–63, 666–67.
133. See id. at 655 n.1 (citing D.C. CODE § 22-4504.01).
134. See id. at 666.
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local laws as constitutional. The Second Circuit, in Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester,135 ruled on New York’s “good cause” provision that required
applicants to articulate a “proper cause” for self-protection.136 Reasons that
satisfied the provision included using a handgun for target practice, hunting,
and self-defense.137 To prove a need for self-defense, applicants had to
“demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of
the general community.”138
California’s “good cause” provision, which was held constitutional by the
Ninth Circuit in Peruta v. County of San Diego,139 required a showing of “a
set of circumstances that distinguish[ed] the applicant from the mainstream
and cause[d] him or her to be placed in harm’s way.”140 Examples included
being a victim of a violent crime or a business owner who normally carries
large sums of cash or who works in remote areas.141
The Third Circuit, in Drake v. Filko,142 analyzed New Jersey’s “good
cause” provision that required its applicants to show a “justifi[ed] need” for
a handgun.143 New Jersey applicants had to show an “urgent necessity for
self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which
demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by
[other] means.”144
Lastly, the Fourth Circuit, in Woollard v. Gallagher,145 analyzed
Maryland’s “good cause” provision that required applicants to provide a
“good and substantial reason” for a concealed carry permit, including certain
business activities, regulated professions, “assumed risk” professions, and
personal protection.146 For the purposes of personal protection, the applicant
needed to show an “apprehended danger,” which was determined by
considering the likelihood of a threat and how temporally and proximally
pertinent the threat was to the applicant.147
Despite the varied standards of the states’ “good cause” provisions, each
of the circuit courts upheld the constitutionality of these laws.148 Similar to
the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn, these sister courts relied on their own
135. 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
136. Id. at 84.
137. Id. at 86.
138. Id.
139. 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at 926.
141. Id.
142. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013).
143. Id. at 428.
144. Id.
145. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).
146. Id. at 869–70.
147. Id. at 870 (Factors considered were “(1) the ‘nearness’ or likelihood of a threat or
presumed threat; (2) whether the threat can be verified; (3) whether the threat is particular to
the applicant, as opposed to the average citizen; (4) if the threat can be presumed to exist, what
is the basis for the presumption; and (5) the length of time since the initial threat occurred.”).
148. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2016); Drake, 724
F.3d at 429; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882–83; Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d
81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012).
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interpretations of the Second Amendment’s core, its relevant history, and the
appropriate standard of review. However, contrary to Wrenn, they asserted
a narrower scope of the Second Amendment’s core, referenced national and
state-specific histories, and proposed various formulations of intermediate
scrutiny. This section analyzes each interpretation in turn.
1. A Narrow Reading of the Second Amendment’s Core
In holding that “good cause” provisions are constitutional, circuit courts
narrowed the Second Amendment’s core to the home. While the Second
Circuit in Kachalsky acknowledged that the Amendment must have some
application to the public possession of firearms, it did not adopt the Wrenn
court’s assertion that the public right should be treated equally.149
Highlighting the Heller I Court’s language of the “right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,”150 where the
“need for the defense of self, family, and property is most acute,”151 the
Kachalsky court limited the core’s protection to the home because it
considered the home to be a special zone that was generally free from
government intrusion.152 This was also consistent with Supreme Court’s
treatment of other individual rights.153 For example, state regulations could
not criminalize the possession of obscene materials if they were in the
home.154 Additionally, regulating private sexual conduct was considered an
“unwarranted” government intrusion into the home.155 The right to public
carry, however, could not be part of the Second Amendment’s core because
states enjoyed a “fair degree of latitude” to impose gun regulations.156
Handgun rights outside of the home were greatly limited because “public
safety interests often outweigh[ed] individual interests in self-defense.”157
Other circuit courts, such as the Third Circuit, also acknowledged that
Heller I may have extended the Second Amendment’s core to a right to
publicly carry handguns for self-defense.158 It considered the language used
in the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Heller I in Moore, which established
that bearing arms for self-defense was “as important outside the home as
inside.”159 However, the Third Circuit ultimately followed the Second
Circuit in Kachalsky because it wanted to err on the side of certainty.160
Heller I’s holding specifically struck down a “single law” that pertained to
149. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89.
150. Id. at 93 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)).
151. Id. at 94 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969)).
155. See id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)).
156. Id. at 96.
157. Id. at 94 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)).
158. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013).
159. Id. (quoting Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012)). For more
information on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the Second Amendment’s core, see supra
Part II.A.1.
160. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 430–31.
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the individual right to possess a handgun in the home.161 Beyond that, Heller
I “was never meant to ‘clarify the entire field’ of Second Amendment
jurisprudence.”162 The Third Circuit believed that the Seventh Circuit in
Moore interpreted the Amendment’s core too broadly.163 It believed that
“Heller’s language ‘warn[ed] readers not to treat Heller as containing
broader holdings than the [Supreme] Court set out to establish: that the
Second Amendment created individual rights, one of which is keeping
operable handguns at home for self-defense.”164
Scholars who agree with these circuit courts focus on the extent of
government regulation of guns in the public space.165 Heller I’s decision was
not meant to assert a conclusion but, rather, to introduce “a really involved
task of figuring out what the Second Amendment means for many different
types of gun laws.”166 Echoing the Second and Third Circuits, scholars argue
that the Second Amendment’s core was not meant to be unlimited in scope
and Heller I even acknowledged this when it provided a nonexhaustive list
of long-standing regulations that were presumptively constitutional.167 In
fact, since Heller I, “significant” areas of gun laws regulating public carry
have been “repeatedly upheld.”168 In addition to categorical prohibitions,169
lower courts have upheld waiting periods for permits, background checks,
gun registration, fingerprinting and photographing, safety training
requirements, and safe storage requirements.170 Through all this legislation,
the Supreme Court has, for the most part, remained silent or declined to
review these regulations,171 which suggests that Heller I was not meant to
endorse broad public carry rights.172
2. Historical Interpretation of Narrower Public Carry Rights
History supporting the narrow scope of the Second Amendment’s core and
the constitutionality of “good cause” provisions is much more varied. The
Second Circuit acknowledged these different histories when it said,
“[h]istory and tradition do not speak with one voice,” alluding to the fact that

161. Id. at 431.
162. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 89 (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
163. Drake, 724 F.3d at 430.
164. Id. at 431 (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010)).
165. See Symposium, supra note 8, at 400–01, 412; see also Symposium, Heller: Past,
Present, and Future, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361, 370 (2018).
166. Symposium, supra note 8, at 400.
167. See id. at 401, 412.
168. Symposium, supra note 165, at 370.
169. Categorical prohibitions refer to “[b]ans on gun possessions by felons, even
nonviolent felons, and other categories of high-risk individuals, including domestic violence
miscreants.” Id.
170. Id.
171. As of February 1, 2018, the Supreme Court had declined to review at least eighty-two
Second Amendment cases since Heller I. Id. at 371. But see supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
172. Symposium, supra note 165, at 370 (referencing the number of gun control regulations
and the courts’ rejection of over 90 percent of gun regulation challenges).
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states had their own perspectives regarding the scope of the right to carry.173
Generally, courts and scholars have relied on the history of concealed carry
amongst the states, the longevity of state-specific provisions, and legislative
history.
For example, the Second Circuit in Kachalsky stated that by the nineteenth
century, government regulation of concealable weapons, which included
handguns, was expansive.174 Most states banned or restricted concealed
weapons for the sake of public safety.175 For example, laws in Ohio and
Virginia allowed the use of concealed weapons for limited reasons similar to
those required in “good cause” provisions.176 Other states, like Georgia and
Tennessee, prohibited individuals from carrying concealed weapons
altogether.177 Dicta in a nineteenth-century Supreme Court case also
indicated that the Second Amendment would not be infringed by the
prohibition of concealed weapons.178
The Ninth Circuit in Peruta took the Second Circuit’s analysis further to
conclude that, given the degree and the extent of state legislation on
concealed weapons in the public space, the Second Amendment could not
have intended to cover concealed carry.179 The Ninth Circuit referenced the
Northampton laws,180 the nation’s pre-Amendment history,181 and the
nation’s post-Amendment history182 and indicated that, within each time
period, state courts have overwhelmingly concluded that the regulation or
prohibition of carrying concealed weapons by the general public was
permitted.183 Given these trends, the Peruta court concluded that the Second
Amendment, at the time of the nation’s founding, could not have
contemplated a general right to concealed carry.184 Instead, the core of the
Second Amendment must have been limited to the home and, if the
Amendment does extend to the public space at all, it must be limited to some
degree of open carry.185
Instead of focusing on national trends, the Third Circuit in Drake argued
for the constitutionality of New Jersey’s “good cause” provision by asserting
that the longevity of its law fit within the presumptively constitutional longstanding exceptions to the Second Amendment.186 The Drake court traced
173. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012).
174. Id. at 95.
175. Id. at 94–95.
176. See id. at 96.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 95–96 (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897)).
179. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 942 (9th Cir. 2016).
180. See id. at 929–32. Note that the Wrenn court addressed the Northampton laws as well
and distinguished them from the “good cause” provisions. See supra Part II.A.2.
181. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 933–36.
182. See id. at 936–39.
183. See id. at 933–39.
184. See id. at 939.
185. See id. at 942. The Ninth Circuit did not speak further on open carry to specify the
extent of the Second Amendment’s reach because the facts in Peruta were limited to the
concealed carry “good cause” provision in California. Id.
186. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 2013).
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New Jersey’s “good cause” provision back to the early twentieth century,
when the law banned the concealed carrying of handguns except for those
who had a “showing of need.”187 Eventually, the law was amended and
revised multiple times; however, the “requirement of ‘need’” endured in each
iteration until the “present-day standard of ‘justifiable need’ became
statutorily enshrined.”188 The court also noted that New York’s “proper
cause” provision analyzed in Kachalsky shared a similar century-old
history.189 These laws fit within the long-standing exceptions to the Second
Amendment because they were just as old as some of the laws that Heller I
explicitly stated were presumptively constitutional.190 For example, the
Supreme Court stated that the prohibition on the possession of firearms by
felons was considered to be “long-standing”; however states only began
enacting these prohibitions in the early twentieth century.191 If the early
twentieth century served as the benchmark for a law to be considered “longstanding,” the court held, then both New York’s “proper cause” and New
Jersey’s “justifiable need” standards would be upheld as presumptively
constitutional.192
In addition to the circuit courts’ analyses of the relevant history, the
legislative history of public carry laws further supports the idea of a Second
Amendment core that is limited to the home.193 The first congressional
debate on public carry laws in 1890 shows that, while there may have been
general acceptance of the right to have guns in the home, “there was a broad
regional variation” regarding what the right to carry would look like in public
spaces.194 For example, most northern states wanted to prohibit carrying
firearms in public with the exception of those who were faced with an
“imminent threat.”195 Most southern states wanted to maintain their tradition
of allowing the open carry of firearms while prohibiting concealed carry.196
Western states, on the other hand, generally advocated for a mixed
approach.197 They wanted to adopt the northern states’ complete prohibition
of public firearms for their populated cities and towns, while placing no
restrictions on gun laws for those on the “rural frontier.”198 Part of Heller I’s
holding was that “the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood
liberties.”199 Therefore, because the issue of public carry, according to
187. Id. at 432.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 433.
190. Id. at 433–34. The list of long-standing exceptions included prohibitions against gun
possession by felons and the mentally ill and the prohibition of guns in sensitive areas. See
supra note 50.
191. Drake, 724 F.3d at 434.
192. Id.
193. See generally Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public
Carry and What It Tells Us About Firearm Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335 (2018).
194. See id. at 354–55.
195. Id. at 339, 355.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) (emphasis added).
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legislative history, was regionally divisive and far from “widely understood,”
the Amendment’s core could not have included the public carrying of
firearms.200
3. A Standard of Review: Intermediate Scrutiny
Unlike the D.C. Circuit in Wrenn, the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits
have subjected “good cause” provisions to the second prong of Heller II’s
two-part test by applying a standard of constitutional scrutiny.201 These
courts have determined that while “good cause” provisions burdened the
Second Amendment to a degree, the laws did not destroy the right altogether
because the Amendment’s self-defense core is centered on the home.202
The Second and Fourth Circuits held that the appropriate level of scrutiny
for the “good cause” provisions was intermediate scrutiny.203 Similar to the
D.C. Circuit in Heller II, the Second Circuit justified its use of intermediate
scrutiny by referencing its First Amendment jurisprudence on private and
public regulations.204 When dealing with First Amendment issues, “contentbased restrictions on noncommercial speech are subject to strict scrutiny,
while laws regulating commercial speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny” because one’s privacy interests are greater in the home.205 The
courts found that this framework was also applicable to the Second
Amendment; Heller I held that the “need for defense of self, family, and
property was most acute” in the home.206 Therefore, for the “good cause”
provisions, which dealt with guns in the public space, the court moved
forward with intermediate scrutiny.207 Adopting a similar framework, the
Fourth Circuit cited to its previous holding in United States v.
Masciandaro,208 where it held that “law[s] that would burden the
‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home . . . would be subject to
strict scrutiny,” but intermediate scrutiny would apply “to laws that burden
[the] right . . . outside of the home.”209
Under intermediate scrutiny, the “good cause” provision passed
constitutional muster if it was “substantially related to the achievement of an
200. See Frassetto, supra note 193, at 355 (stating that “[w]ith this level of variation, it is
impossible to say any conception of the Second Amendment, let alone a conception mandating
a broad right to carry firearms in public, constituted a widely understood right”).
201. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 434–39 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712
F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93–96 (2d
Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit did not apply any standard of review because it held that the
Second Amendment guaranteed no right to concealed carry; therefore, it was not a Second
Amendment issue. See Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 942 (9th Cir. 2016).
202. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 430–31; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at
93–94.
203. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93.
204. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 94.
205. Id. (citations omitted).
206. Id. (quoting Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
207. See id. at 96.
208. 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011).
209. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Masciandaro, 638
F.3d at 470–71).
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important governmental interest.”210 The Kachalsky court held that New
York’s “proper cause” provisions triggered important governmental interests
in public safety and crime prevention.211 To determine whether the
provisions were substantially related to the stated interests, the court
emphasized that the fit of the challenged legislation did not have to be
perfect.212 As long as New York showed that its legislation was not “an
arbitrary licensing regime” but rather a product of “assessing the risks and
benefits of handgun possession,” the bar of intermediate scrutiny would be
met.213 Here, the court determined that New York had considered data
indicating that “widespread access to handguns in public increase[d] the
likelihood that felonies w[ould] result in death and fundamentally alter[ed]
the safety and character of public spaces.”214 Furthermore, limiting the
concealed carry of handguns may help law enforcement by giving officers a
greater opportunity to lawfully intervene before fatal consequences could
occur.215 Because of this information, New York created a licensing scheme
that sufficiently balanced the interests of its people while addressing the
issues of public safety and crime prevention.216
The Fourth Circuit in Woollard offered additional insight into the
application of intermediate scrutiny. While the important government
interests in public safety and crime prevention remained the same, to show a
substantial basis, the Woollard court relied on significant data indicating that
(1) the number of violent crimes committed in the State has increased
alarmingly in recent years; (2) a high percentage of violent crimes
committed in the State involves the use of handguns; (3) the result is a
substantial increase in the number of deaths and injuries largely traceable
to the carrying of handguns in public places by criminals; [and] (4) current
law has not been effective in curbing the more frequent use of handguns in
committing crime.217

The court also relied on the state’s findings that Maryland had the “‘eighth
highest violent crime rate,’ ‘the third highest homicide rate,’ and the ‘second
highest robbery rate’ of any state in 2009.”218 Furthermore, at the time,
“97.4% of all homicides by firearm were committed with handguns” and “of
the 158 Maryland law enforcement officers who have died in the line of

210. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96.
211. Id. at 97.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 98–99.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 98.
216. The “proper cause” provision did not apply to people who wanted to use a handgun
for target practice or hunting, to people who had an actual and articulable need for selfdefense, to people engaged in certain employment situations, to merchants and storekeepers
to keep guns in their place of business, to messengers for banking institutions and express
companies, to state judges and justices, and to employees at correctional facilities. Id.
217. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876–77 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-202).
218. Id. at 877.
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duty . . . 132—or 83.5%—died as the result of intentional gun fire, usually
from a handgun.”219
Additionally, the Woollard court gave a substantial list of public policy
reasons why a “good and substantial reason” requirement would help to
prevent crime and ensure public safety.220 Limiting the public carrying of
handguns would decrease the availability of handguns to potential criminals,
lessen the likelihood of confrontations between individuals turning deadly,
lessen the chance of confusion or hesitation by police officers, maintain
routine and trusting relationships with police officers,221 and limit the
expenditure of police resources by reducing the number of handgun
sightings.222 Therefore, the Woollard court held that the additional
concealed carry requirement was constitutional because Maryland
“demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement [was]
reasonably adapted to Maryland’s significant interests in protecting public
safety and preventing crime.”223
The Third Circuit in Drake also held that intermediate scrutiny would
apply to New Jersey’s “good cause” provision requiring concealed carry
applicants to show a “justified need.”224 However, instead of asking whether
there was a substantial basis behind an important governmental interest, the
Drake court asked whether there was a “reasonable fit” between the
government interest and the “good cause” provision.225 As long as the law
did not “burden more conduct than [what was] reasonably necessary,” the
law would pass constitutional muster.226 Additionally, when assessing the
constitutionality of statutes, the Third Circuit’s intermediate scrutiny gave
“substantial deference” to the legislature.227
Given the deferential nature of the Third Circuit’s approach, the Drake
court upheld the constitutionality of New Jersey’s “justifiable need”
provision despite the fact that New Jersey did not provide the court with any
evidence underlying its legislation.228 In fact, the Third Circuit came up with
reasons of their own by referencing the Supreme Court of New Jersey’s
opinion in Siccardi v. State,229 where a report found that the “possession of
a handgun is rarely an effective means of self-protection,” “no data exist
which would establish the value of firearms as a defense against attack on the
219. Id.
220. See id. at 879–81.
221. “If the number of legal handguns on the streets increased significantly, police officers
would have no choice but to take extra precautions before engaging citizens, effectively
treating encounters between police and the community . . . as high-risk stops, which demand
a much more rigid protocol.” Id. at 880.
222. More resources would have to be spent responding to reports of handgun sightings
and identifying potential security risks because more people may have guns without having a
good and substantial reasons to do so. Id.
223. Id. at 882.
224. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436–37 (3d Cir. 2013).
225. See id. at 437.
226. Id. at 436.
227. Id. at 436–37.
228. See id. at 437.
229. 284 A.2d 533 (N.J. 1971).
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street,” and “the ready accessibility of guns contributes significantly to the
number of unpremeditated homicides and to the seriousness of many
assaults.”230 This report, along with New Jersey’s assertion that handguns
are “obviously” dangerous and deadly in nature because the presence of guns
“exposes members of the community to a somewhat heightened risk” of
injury, sufficed to pass the necessary constitutional muster of the Third
Circuit’s version of intermediate scrutiny.231
III. A NARROWER SCOPE, A PULL AWAY FROM HISTORY, AND A CALL FOR
MORE DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Heller I left lower courts with
more questions than answers. What is the scope of the Second Amendment’s
self-defense core? What type of source or time period of history is relevant
to cite? What is the appropriate standard of review or level of constitutional
scrutiny? These ambiguities led to a circuit split where the courts, using their
discretion, arrived at a wide range of interpretations. This Part addresses
each of these questions with a plausible perspective for future courts to
consider. First, this Part argues that the Second Amendment’s core includes
a public right to carry; however, this public right is a much weaker right.
Second, this Part argues that courts should avoid undertaking a historical
analysis until the Supreme Court provides more clarity regarding the relevant
history that matters for Second Amendment issues. Lastly, this Part argues
that the Second Amendment should be treated as a separate right, instead of
comparing it to the First Amendment, to determine the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny. Courts should follow the Third Circuit’s analysis in
Drake and apply a “lesser” intermediate scrutiny that is more deferential to
the legislature. Therefore, under a more deferential intermediate scrutiny
analysis, “good cause” provisions232 should be deemed constitutional.
A. The Second Amendment’s Core Includes a Weaker Public Right
The most natural reading of Heller I is that the Second Amendment’s core
of self-defense exists both in the home and in the public space. First, the
Supreme Court established that the Amendment considered both private and
public spaces in McDonald, which clarified that “self-defense is a basic right,
recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day.”233
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit in Moore correctly pointed out that when
the Supreme Court said that the need for self-defense was “most acute” in the
home, the use of the comparative term suggests that the need for self-defense
230. Id. at 552 (quoting GEORGE D. NEWTON, JR. & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, NAT’L COMM’N
CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, FIREARMS & VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 67
(1969),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/769NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
U8UY-NXL9]).
231. See Drake, 724 F.3d at 438–39.
232. For examples of the exact language of the statutes discussed in these cases, see supra,
note 21. For a further description of these statutes, see supra Parts II.A–B.
233. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
ON THE
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is less acute outside of the home.234 This natural reading also makes sense
when considering the Supreme Court’s definition of “keeping and bearing
arms” as the “right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”235
As the Supreme Court did not specify “confrontation in the home,” it suggests
that the Second Amendment was meant to cover confrontations in public
spaces as well.
While the Second Amendment protects both private and public carrying,
the latter seems to be a weaker right. The Wrenn court proposed that both
rights should be considered equally;236 however, that reading does not seem
to align with the comparative terminology that the Supreme Court used
throughout Heller I to distinguish the home.237 Furthermore, the Second
Circuit in Kachalsky referred to a number of other individual rights that
followed a similar framework, where the individual interests were greatest in
the home and weaker elsewhere.238 Lastly, the sheer number and extent of
the limitations already placed on public carrying, from categorical
prohibitions to training requirements, together with the Supreme Court’s
silence on these issues, strongly suggest that the public right was meant to be
a lesser right.239
This interpretation of the Second Amendment’s core also makes sense
when balancing the individual’s interest with public safety. Once outside of
the home, the individual interest in self-defense clashes with the
government’s interest in keeping its citizens safe.240 In this situation, the
balance should be tipped in favor of public safety because “[p]roviding for
the safety of citizens within their borders has long been [the] state
government’s most basic task.”241 It is hard to disagree with the notion that
the most fundamental right is not the right to self-defense but the right to
live.242 The right to life is unique because “it is the necessary condition for
the enjoyment of all other goods. Therefore, every person by and large tends
to value his life preeminently, and any society must place a high value on
preserving it.”243 In fact, even the Second Circuit in Kachalsky mentioned
that the right to self-defense is constrained by other laws to ensure that the
right to live is prioritized.244 This is the right that justifies the passing of

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2012); supra Part II.A.1.
Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); see also supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.1.
Heller I, 554 U.S. at 628.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.B.3; see also Symposium, Heller and Public Carry Restrictions, 40
CAMPBELL L. REV. 431, 437 (2018) (asserting that “all constitutional rights are circumscribed
by public safety”).
241. Symposium, supra note 240, at 438.
242. Id. at 437.
243. Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 871, 871 (1976).
244. See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 100 (2d Cir. 2012) (referring
to a New York law that prevented an individual from engaging in self-defense with a firearm
until the “objective circumstances justify the use of deadly force”).
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numerous public carry regulations and makes the Second Amendment’s core
of self-defense in public spaces necessarily weaker.
B. A Historical Analysis Should Be Avoided
Without additional clarity from the Supreme Court, historical analysis of
“good cause” provisions should be avoided. The Kachalsky court said it best:
“history and tradition do not speak with one voice.”245 Various perspectives
have shaped centuries of history and this allows courts to pull out pieces of
history that will best fit their positions. For example, the Wrenn court cited
historical case law to support broad acceptance of public carrying.246
However, its sister courts asserted historical case law along with national
trends to support the opposite conclusion.247 Additionally, the distinctions
drawn by the Wrenn court between the “good cause” provisions at issue and
the Northampton and English “surety laws” hold some merit.248 However, it
is also hard to ignore the fact that some of the “good cause” provisions are
just as old as the “long-standing” exceptions that the Supreme Court
referenced in Heller I and that the legislative history of public carry laws
actually indicates a regionally divisive Congress.249
Ultimately, historical analysis is unreliable in this context because history
is malleable.250 Similar to how one formulates an argument based on case
law, courts can take language from history and parse it until it makes “perfect
sense.”251 These sorts of historical debates “tend to reduce to, ‘Yeah, but
yours are wrong, and mine are right.’”252 What is needed is a normative
standard of history that all courts can refer to.253 This is a standard that
should be determined by the Supreme Court because unanimity amongst
lower courts is unlikely.254 Until the Supreme Court steps in to “draw the
line between a sufficient historical record to uphold a firearm regulation and
a record that is too sparse,”255 historical analyses of “good cause” provisions
will continue to lack consistency.
C. The Appropriate Standard of Review: Intermediate Scrutiny
Following the two-part test established in Heller II, “good cause”
provisions burden the Second Amendment, which makes them subject to the
different tiers of constitutional scrutiny. The Wrenn court argued that the
tiers of scrutiny did not apply to D.C.’s “good cause” provisions because the
245. Id. at 91.
246. See supra Part II.A.2.
247. See supra Part II.B.2.
248. See supra Part II.A.2.
249. See supra Part II.B.2.
250. See Symposium, supra note 240, at 447.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Frassetto, supra note 193, at 356 (referring, for example, to the lack of unanimity
amongst the states during the first congressional debate on public carry).
255. Id.
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provisions effectively banned public carry and destroyed the Second
Amendment.256 However, the Wrenn court’s assertion assumed that the
Second Amendment protection applies equally in the home and in public.257
This Note has argued that the right to public carry is necessarily a weaker
right.258 Therefore, while “good cause” provisions regulating handguns in
the home would likely be deemed unconstitutional, “good cause” provisions
for concealed public carry should not be held to the same standard. Since
public carrying is a weaker right, these laws only burden, not destroy, the
Second Amendment and the tiers of constitutional scrutiny apply.259
Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for concealed
public carry regulations. Almost all lower courts have used intermediate
scrutiny to assess gun regulations—reaching a near-consensus.260
Furthermore, it seems to fit neatly within the framework that courts have used
to assess regulations dealing with other individual rights, such as the First
Amendment.261 Strict scrutiny would apply for gun regulations in the home,
where the Second Amendment’s protection is greatest; however,
intermediate scrutiny would apply when the regulations affect gun
possession outside the home.262
The difference in the amount of information that the Second and Fourth
Circuits relied on in their applications of intermediate scrutiny is relevant.263
While the Fourth Circuit pulled from numerous sources of state-specific data
and made multiple public policy arguments for better law enforcement and
crime prevention, the Second Circuit seemed content with general data
connecting guns with greater risks of violence.264 Perhaps this speaks to the
“malleable” nature of intermediate scrutiny;265 however, it may be an issue
that the courts may look to normalize to ensure a consistent application of
the law.
Nevertheless, under intermediate scrutiny, “good cause” provisions pass
constitutional muster. The government has an important and compelling

256. See supra Part II.A.3.
257. See supra Part II.A.2.
258. See supra Part III.A. Even if the right to public carry was considered an equal right,
“good cause” provisions do not seem to function as a “total ban” as the Wrenn court described.
A 2017 study has shown that 98.6 percent of all gun licensing applications were approved
between 2006 and 2014. JACK MCDEVITT & JANICE IWAMA, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT RELATIVE TO THE REDUCTION IN GUN VIOLENCE 22 (2017),
https://www.northeastern.edu/csshresearch/irj/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/
Massachusetts-Gun-Violence-Reduction-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAQ2-XDPG]. This
suggests people who want guns are getting them.
259. See supra Part II.B.3.
260. See Symposium, supra note 8, at 402.
261. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
262. See supra Part II.B.3.
263. See supra Part II.B.3. The Ninth and Third Circuits are left out because the Ninth
Circuit did not apply any standard of review and the Third Circuit, in its intermediate scrutiny
application, was not provided with any information. See supra Part II.B.3.
264. See supra Part II.B.3.
265. See Symposium, supra note 8, at 410.
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interest in public safety and crime prevention.266 Furthermore, in Kachalsky
and Woollard, New York and Maryland both established a substantial basis
for the “good cause” provisions by showing that their legislation was not “an
arbitrary licensing regime” but a product of balancing the risks and benefits
of concealed carry.267
Critics have indicated that “good cause” provisions should fail
intermediate scrutiny because they unfairly burden the law-abiding citizen
with a necessary showing of proof in order to obtain a handgun for concealed
carry.268 Instead of the government carrying the burden of proving that an
individual constitutes a threat, the individual is assumed to be a threat until
he or she proves otherwise.269 This argument holds some merit because the
“foundations” of criminal law always place the burden on the government.270
Intermediate scrutiny requires courts to consider whether the government
can implement a “substantially less restrictive alternative.”271 However, in
instances where the alternatives would be “too administratively burdensome,
and difficult,” a law can still be considered constitutional.272 This line of
reasoning would apply to “good cause” provisions. It would be an
impractical strain on resources to have the government identify every
individual who is eligible for a concealed carry permit. This would also
require the government to gather personal information, such as a history of
physical altercations, that the individual may not want to share. It is
ultimately much less burdensome for people who want a concealed carry
permit to identify themselves.
D. A Call for a More Deferential Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis
Unlike the Second and Fourth Circuits, the Third Circuit in Drake applied
a version of intermediate scrutiny that only required New Jersey to show that
its “good cause” provision reasonably fits within the government’s important
interests in public safety and crime prevention.273 While this “lesser”
intermediate scrutiny is not the standard that the lower courts commonly use,
courts should consider applying a standard that is more deferential to the
legislature.
Courts have drawn parallels between the Second Amendment and the First
Amendment in formulating a standard of review for gun regulations.274
However, the Second Amendment should not be compared to any other
266. See supra Parts II.B.3, III.A.
267. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
supra Part II.B.3.
268. See Craipo, supra note 92, at 230.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 229.
271. Symposium, supra note 8, at 408.
272. Id. (referring to a Tenth Circuit case, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Service, 790 F.3d 1121
(10th Cir. 2015), where the prohibition of guns in post office parking lots was upheld because
assessing the eligibility of each employee and issuing licenses would be too burdensome).
273. See supra Part II.B.3.
274. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.B.3.
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amendment—it should stand on its own. The Second Amendment is, by
nature, a unique right because it is our “most dangerous right.”275 The right
to have a gun naturally increases the risk of harm to those around the
individual and to the community at large.276 No other enumerated right has
implications to public safety to the degree that the Second Amendment
does.277 Put simply, “[t]he unique nature of the Second Amendment Right
demands its own unique jurisprudence.”278 In fact, in other areas of the law,
the First and Second Amendments are treated differently. For example, when
individuals are convicted of a verbal offense, such as fraud or libel, they still
retain their rights of speech.279 However, when people are convicted of a
crime involving a handgun, there are various restrictions that are placed on
the right to carry.280
The Second Circuit in Kachalsky, while it ultimately applied a normal
intermediate scrutiny analysis, also considered a more deferential
approach.281 The Kachalsky court implied that the public regulation of
firearms is a matter “beyond the competence of the courts” and that the
legislature was “better equipped” to make “sensitive public policy
judgments . . . concerning the dangers in carrying firearms.”282 Similarly,
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the Fourth Circuit pushed for a more
deferential approach by stating:
Disenfranchising the American people on this life and death subject would
be the gravest and most serious of steps. It is their community, not ours. It
is their safety, not ours. It is their lives, not ours. To say in the wake of so
many mass shootings in so many localities across this country that people
themselves are now to be rendered newly powerless, that all they can do is
stand by and watch as federal courts design their destiny—this would
deliver a body blow to democracy as we have known it since the very
founding of this nation.283

Deference would allow courts to consider the nuances of every city, for
example, the significant differences between rural and urban norms and
culture.284 Furthermore, gun regulations already spark a lot of political
activity.285 Therefore, judicial intervention is not needed because the
“political safeguards” are “sufficiently robust” to prevent any abuse of the
law.286 Lastly, deference to the legislature would allow for elected officials

275. Symposium, supra note 8, at 410.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 411.
279. Id. at 423.
280. Id.
281. See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).
282. Id. at 97.
283. Symposium, supra note 240, at 438 (quoting Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 150 (4th
Cir. 2017) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
284. See WALDMAN, supra note 34, at 173.
285. Symposium, supra note 8, at 421–22.
286. Id.
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to be held accountable, which may incentivize ordinary citizens to be more
politically active.287
CONCLUSION
Mass shootings have become commonplace. Statistics indicate about one
mass shooting occurs every day.288 Therefore, there may be a greater push
for gun regulations, including “good cause” provisions for the concealed
carry of handguns. While the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits
have weighed in on the issue, their sister courts may soon be called to assert
a position. There needs to be an urgency to carefully assess these gun laws
because guns, generally, impact people’s lives. Courts should strive to
standardize their jurisprudence on this consequential matter by consistently
deeming “good cause” provisions constitutional.
A natural reading of Heller I suggests that the right to public carry is
necessarily a weaker right compared to the right to have a handgun in the
home. Additionally, when assessing “good cause” provisions, courts should
avoid historical analysis until further clarification from the Supreme Court is
given and should be more deferential to state legislatures. States are best
equipped to understand the contexts of their localities and protect their
citizens. Furthermore, in the public space, the government’s interest in the
safety of its citizens should take priority over the Second Amendment’s core
of self-defense because the right to live—not the right to self-defense—is the
most fundamental right.289

287. Symposium, supra note 240, at 455.
288. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
289. Symposium, supra note 240, at 437.

